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UAbstractU:  This paper develops and tests a unique model of asymmetric employer learning.  The model 
relaxes the informational assumptions used in most of the previous literature and assumes firms compete 
for workers through bidding wars.  As a result, outside firms can profitably compete for an employed 
worker who is equally productive in any firm, despite the current employer's informational advantage.  The 
model in this paper is the first in the literature to predict either wage growth without changes in publicly 
observed information (e.g., promotions) or mobility between firms without firm- or match-specific 
productivity.  The bidding through which firms compete for a worker produces a sequence of wages that 
converges to the current employer’s conditional expectation of the worker’s productivity.  This 
convergence of wages allows the model to be tested using an extension of previous work on employer 
learning.  Wage regressions estimated on a sample of men from the NLSY produce evidence consistent 
with the model’s predictions. 
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allows all ﬁrms that encounter a worker to receive a private signal of the worker’s productivity;
however, the worker’s current employer is able to accumulate more private information than
outside ﬁrms. Firms are also assumed to compete for workers through bidding wars. Despite
the current employer’s informational advantage, this assumption allows less well-informed ﬁrms
to proﬁtably bid for an employed worker even when the worker is equally productive in any
ﬁrm. This competition causes wages in the model to converge to the employer’s expectation as
the worker’s employment spell increases in length, and results in workers with the same publicly
observable signals having diﬀerent wages.
The convergence of wages to the employer’s expectation also allows the model to be tested
empirically with a simple extension of the work of Altonji and Pierret (2000) and Farber and
Gibbons (1996) on public learning. They show that as wages become more correlated with
productivity due to employer learning, the coeﬃcients in wage regressions on variables that are
correlated with productivity but diﬃcult for employers to observe will increase. The model
in this paper implies that employer learning that occurs publicly is reﬂected as learning with
experience in the labor market, while employer learning that occurs privately is reﬂected as
learning over the current employment spell.
Most of the previous literature on asymmetric employer learning has been theoretical, fo-
cusing primarily on the relationship of wages to task assignment. Waldman (1984) develops a
basic model of task assignment under asymmetric information. He assumes that the current
employer becomes perfectly informed after one period of tenure, andoutside ﬁrms learn about
the worker only by observing her task assignment at the current ﬁrm. Wages do not rise unless
a promotion signals higher ability to outside ﬁrms, implying that workers in the same job (withthe same publicly observable characteristics) have the same wage. Workers are ineﬃciently
assigned to jobs as ﬁrms determine assignment strategically. Several later papers, including
Milgrom and Oster (1987), Bernhardt (1995) and Scoones and Bernhardt (1998), expand on
this basic model1.
Most of these previous models assume that outside ﬁrms possess no information that the
current employer does not also possess. Typically, the current employer is perfectly informed
and other ﬁrms receive information only by observing the employer’s actions. This implies that
outside ﬁrms cannot proﬁtably bid for workers in the absence of match-speciﬁc productivity.
As a result, there is no mobility between jobs without match- (or ﬁrm-) speciﬁc productivity
and no wage growth without promotions or some other change in publicly observed information.
This last point is the major criticism that Gibbons and Waldman (1999) make of the literature,
and is one of the shortcomings this paper addresses.
The only previous paper in this literature that does not assume the current employer knows
everything competing ﬁrms know is Waldman (1990). In his model of “up-or-out” contracts, the
market observes a signal of the worker’s productivity that the employer does not; however, when
outside ﬁrms compete for the worker their bid reveals their information to the current employer.
Because the current employer can then counter knowing the value of both the market’s signal
and its own, a severe winner’s curse problem causes the market to condition its bid on the
minimum employer signal suﬃcient to generate a promotion. As a result, the worker is always
retained. In essence, the bidding mechanism in Waldman (1990) prevents outside ﬁrms from
1 Milgrom and Oster (1987) develop a model of labor market discrimination in a setting where a promotion
makes a worker completely “visible” to outside ﬁrms. Bernhardt (1995) focuses on promotion “fast tracks”.
Scoones and Bernhardt (1998) include match-speciﬁc productivity and show that workers may invest in an
ineﬃciently large amount of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital in order to increase their chances of being promoted and
possibly bid away.
2competing for workers in a way that could generate wage growth without promotions or mobility
between jobs.
The model developed in this paper shows that there can be wage growth that reﬂects private
employer learning and mobility between jobs in the face of asymmetric employer learning, even
when the worker is equally productive in any ﬁrm. I assume that the current employer only
becomes perfectly informed in the limit as the length of the current employment spell approaches
inﬁnity, and I allow outside ﬁrms to receive noisy private signals from interviews or other ﬁrm-
speciﬁc evaluations. I also allow outside ﬁrms to compete for workers through bidding wars
(ascending bid auctions). Because the winning bidder pays the highest losing bid, bidding wars
avoid the winner’s curse that aﬀects Waldman (1990) and others. As a result, outside ﬁrms can
proﬁtably bid for employed workers as long as they have some private information. This bidding
causes wages to converge to the employer’s expectation even when there are no promotions or
other signals of the employer’s private information, and workers who otherwise appear identical
to the market have diﬀerent wages.
Although this literature was originally motivated by studies of personnel records2,G i b b o n s
and Katz (1991) is the only previous paper to develop and test a model of asymmetric employer
learning. In their model, layoﬀs signal to the market that the worker is of lower ability. Because
displacement by a plant closing should not contain the same negative signal, workers who are
laid oﬀ are compared to those who are displaced by a plant closing to control for the eﬀects of
displacement. Their estimation using CPS data supports their predictions.
The current paper is one of a few recent papers that attempt to further bridge the gap
2 See, for example, Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980, 1981), and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b).
3between theory and evidence in this literature3. The model of asymmetric learning that is
developed in the next section implies that wage regressions will reﬂect evidence of asymmetric
employer learning as the length of the worker’s current employment spell increases, in addition
to evidence of public learning with experience. This implication is tested using data from the
NLSY, and the estimation results suggest that wages during an employment spell are aﬀected
at least as much by asymmetric learning as they are by public learning.
The next section develops the model of asymmetric employer learning. In Section 2, I discuss
the empirical test of my model. Section 3 describes the data I use and Section 4 presents the
estimation results. Section 5 concludes and discusses avenues for future research.
1. The Asymmetric Learning Model
Turning to the theoretical contribution of this paper, I ﬁrst describe the basic assumptions of my
model. I then describe the equilibrium bidding strategies of ﬁrms that encounter the worker. In
Section 1.3, I describe the current employers’ private information and the information contained
in a worker’s wage. This section then concludes with a discussion of the sequence of wages
produced by the model, which shows that wages converge to the current employer’s expectation
as the length of the employment spell increases.
3The other two are DeVaro and Waldman (2004), who empirically investigate the value of promotions as
signals; and Schoenberg (2004), who performs tests that also extend earlier work on public learning. Schoenberg’s
work will be discussed later in the paper as the empirical results are presented.
41.1. Basic Assumptions








In what follows, x =1 ,2,... indexes periods of the worker’s labor market experience. Periods
of time during a spell in which the worker is continuously employed, regardless of whether he
changes employers, are indexed by t. Periods of tenure with the current employer are indexed
by τ.
Workers are assumed to transition from employment to unemployment due to an exogenous
rate of job destruction. This ensures that the length of the current employment spell and
experience are not generally the same, while avoiding the added complication of modelling
transitions into unemployment4.
1.1.1. Timing and Informational Assumptions
Market Learning over Experience I assume that some learning about a worker’s produc-
tivity is public so that my model will nest the learning models of Altonji and Pierret (2000) and
Farber and Gibbons (1996) (AP and FG in what follows) in which all learning is public. At any
level of experience x let Sx summarize the market’s information. I assume Sx is an unbiased
estimate of the worker’s true productivity:
Sx = µ + ηx,
4Previous versions of this paper assumed that wages were downwardly rigid and workers were ﬁred if their
expected productivity fell below the wage.






x is decreasing in experience. In other words, the market’s infor-
mation about a worker grows more precise with experience5.
Intuitively, the market’s information can be thought of as the information contained in a
worker’s resume (e.g., what jobs he has held, the duration of each and the duration of past
unemployment spells). It will be important later in the paper to distinguish the market’s
information from information that will appear public from the viewpoint of the two ﬁrms involved
in a bidding war in a given period. For example, both of those ﬁrms will observe the worker’s
current wage in my model; but the market as a whole will not observe that wage or the worker’s
wage history, and the wage will not enter into Sx. Although this assumption may at ﬁrst seem
unusual, I believe it is realistic: A ﬁrm that wants to hire a worker is likely to know that worker’s
current wage and something of her experience, but is not likely to have observed every single
wage innovation over a worker’s career.
Time During an Employment Spell First, I assume that any ﬁrm f that encounters
worker i for the ﬁrst time in any period receives a private signal, νfi, from an interview or other
evaluation:
νfi = µi + efi, (1)





. The distribution of νfi is common knowledge. For simplicity, the
worker is assumed never to encounter a ﬁrm she has worked for or been interviewed by in the
past: Firms are sampled at random without replacement.
At t =0 , the worker is unemployed and randomly encounters two ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm interviews
5Sx is easily derived using a standard Bayesian updating argument; i.e., Sx is a variance-weighted sum of all
signals the market has received up to period x.
6the worker and receives a private signal, νfi.T h e ﬁrms then engage in a bidding war for the
worker and the worker agrees to become employed by the winner6.
In each later period, t ≥ 1, of the employment spell, the worker is assumed to encounter
one new ﬁrm. The worker reveals her current wage to the new ﬁrm, and that ﬁrm draws its
own private signal described by equation (1). If the new ﬁrm is willing to pay more than the
worker’s current wage, it engages in a bidding war with the current employer. As before, the
worker becomes employed by the winning bidder.
I assume there are never more than two ﬁrms bidding for the worker in any period for
simplicity. I discuss relaxing that assumption to allow more bidders below.
As will be discussed shortly, bidding wars result in the winner observing any private infor-
mation possessed by a losing bidder. This implies that the current employer’s information at
t =1includes its own signal and that of the losing ﬁrm in t =0 .A t t =2 , it includes the signals
of the losing bidders in t =0and t =1 . In any period, the current employer always knows the
values of all signals received by losing ﬁrms in all previous periods of the current employment
spell in addition to its own. (The evolution of St will be discussed in greater detail later in this
section.)
Finally, I assume that the current employer lowers the wage so that wxt = E (µ|Sx,S t) if Sx
or St fall enough that the worker’s expected productivity would otherwise fall below the current
wage.
6I’m assumming that any reservation wages unemployed individuals might have are low enough not to matter
in order to simplify the presentation.
71.1.2. The Assumption of Bidding Wars
As mentioned above, I model wages as the outcomes of a series of bidding wars (English auctions),
each of which has two bidders. One ﬁrm oﬀers the worker a wage, another ﬁrm makes a counter-
oﬀer, and so on until one ﬁrm drops out. The remaining ﬁrm then hires the worker at the
wage where the losing ﬁrm dropped out, which will be less than the remaining ﬁrm’s ex post
expectation of the worker’s productivity.
This bidding process allows me to exploit standard results from the auction literature7,
making it very tractable, while also providing intuitively appealing results that are useful when
modelling bidding under asymmetric information. Bidding wars result in winning ﬁrms ob-
serving the signals of losing ﬁrms, allowing employers to learn about a worker by observing the
intensity with which other ﬁrms compete for that workers’ services as in Lazear (1986). Bidding
wars also result in the employer paying the worker her outside option, a result that is key, for
example, in Scoones and Bernhardt (1998).
More importantly, bidding wars allow outside ﬁrms to bid proﬁtably for workers under a
wider range of assumptions than other bidding mechanisms do8. The winning ﬁrm in a bidding
war pays the worker the highest wage that the losing ﬁrm was willing to pay. This means that
the winning ﬁrm pays a wage that is less than its ex post expectation of the worker’s productivity
as long as it possesses some private information about the worker, even if the losing bidder had
private information that was more precise. In contrast, assuming that the current employer
makes one ﬁnal counteroﬀer after an outside ﬁrm reveals its bid results in such a severe winner’s
curse for the outside ﬁrm that it can never do better than earn zero proﬁts, even under symmetric
7See McAﬀee and McMillan (1987) and Klemperer (1999) for readable surveys.
8Although it is diﬃcult to justify any speciﬁc bidding assumption empirically, we at least know that bidding
wars for workers do take place. Examples can be found in academic labor markets.
8information9.
Milgrom and Weber (1982) (MW from here on) show that an equilibrium bid for each ﬁrm
in this auction is the expectation of productivity conditional on the signal it receives and the
signal of the other ﬁrm being the same. Abstracting for a moment from what information
bidders in my model have in a certain period, if If and Ig denote the information of ﬁrms f and
g, respectively, the optimal bid of ﬁrm f is
b(Ifi)=E (µi|Ifi,I gi = Ifi). (2)
In other words, b(Ifi) is the highest wage ﬁrm f is willing to bid for worker i when it has the
information in Ifi
10. The speciﬁc form this optimal bid takes for each ﬁrm in each period of my
model will be described in the next subsection. Appendix A discusses the assumptions that are
necessary for this equilibrium bidding strategy to hold, as well as how those assumptions nest
mine. Finally, note that I assume ﬁrms act as though the expected value of future auctions
d o e sn o ti m p a c tt h e i ro p t i m a lb i d s 11.
With the bidding strategy described above, ﬁrm f will win the bidding war if Ifi >I gi (i.e.,
9Whether the outside bid is the bid of one other ﬁrm or the market’s expectation [as in Waldman (1984)
and others], any outside bid that is based on the bidder’s information essentially reveals that information to the
current employer. The outside bidder will only outbid the current employer by bidding above the expectation
of productivity conditional on both its own information and that of the current employer. As a result, it can do
no better than zero proﬁts.
The outside ﬁrm would obviously face less of a winner’s curse in models where the current employer does not
make a counter-oﬀer; but the winner’s curse in those cases, which resemble ﬁrst-price auctions, would still be
larger than with a bidding war.
10This is Thereom 6 in MW. See Appendix A.
11This greatly simpliﬁes my analysis by allowing me to ignore the discounted value of future expected rents,
which will vary with employment spell duration and experience. It should not, however, qualitatively aﬀect
my results because the ex post expected discounted present value of the worker’s services is the same regardless
of which ﬁrm wins. Any option value associated with future auctions would vary with the ex post conditional
variance of µ,w h i c hi st h es a m ef o rb o t hﬁrms, not with the variance conditional on the information each ﬁrm
possesses prior to the bidding war.
9if its signal is higher than ﬁrm g’s), and will pay a wage equal to ﬁrm g’s bid, b(Igi).F i r m f’s ex
post expectation would then be E (µi|Ifi,I gi), which is greater than b(Igi)=E (µi|Ifi = Igi,I gi).
This equilibrium strategy, therefore, results in positive expected proﬁts for the winning ﬁrm.
This equilibrium result is well known in the auction literature and is formally presented in
work cited above; however, the intuition is worth repeating. As discussed in Klemperer (1999),
the case in which a bidder is tied for having the highest signal is the marginal case in which that
bidder is indiﬀerent between winning and losing. If she wins the bidding above that point, she
pays more than her ex post expectation. At lower bids, she could further improve her chances of
winning at a positive proﬁtb yc o n t i n u i n gt oc o u n t e ro ﬀers. Any ﬁrm f, therefore, will continue
to counter bids up to b(Ifi), and drop out of the bidding above that point.
Note that this argument does not depend on information being symmetric. The analysis of
this paper is simpliﬁed by the fact that the equilibrium in a bidding war is essentially the same
under either symmetric or asymmetric information. This result is well known in the auction
literature; however, I formalize the argument in the context of my model as Proposition 1 in the
next subsection to provide further intuition.
This paper follows MW in only considering the strategically symmetric equilibrium (i.e., the
equilibrium in which all bidders follow the same strategy) of a two-player common-value English
auction. There is also a continuum of strategically asymmetric equilibria in which one bidder
bids more aggressively and the other bids more timidly (Milgrom, 1981), but there are good
reasons to only consider the symmetric equilibrium in this case. First, Bikhchandani and Riley
(1993) show that if any component of the item’s value is private, then the symmetric equilibrium
is unique, at least when the auction is limited to two bidders12. The likelihood of there being
12This assumes that ﬁrms will not bid in order to form reputations for being aggressive. I maintain the same
10some degree of match-speciﬁc productivity in labor markets makes the symmetric equilibrium
a likely approximation of reality13. Furthermore, asymmetric equilibria in the current setting
would require that ﬁrms adopt well known strategies as far as when to bid aggressively and when
not to. An asymmetric equilibrium would not be stable if ﬁrms did not know how aggressive
competing bidders were, or if some ﬁrms were always aggressive and others always timid14.
Finally, I should point out that relaxing my assumption of two bidders in each bidding war
would only have a qualitative eﬀect on my results as the number of bidders approached inﬁnity.
As MW show, an English auction with more than two bidders reduces to an auction between
the two bidders with the highest signals in which the signals of all other bidders are common
knowledge. As the number of bidders approaches inﬁnity, the bidding war will converge to
Bertrand competition with the ﬁnal bidders having perfect information and the worker being
paid a wage equal to her actual productivity {see Klemperer (1999)}. Otherwise, since my
model already incorporates some information that is common knowledge between bidders, Sx
and (when t ≥ 1) the wage, allowing more than two bidders in a given bidding war would mostly
serve to complicate my presentation.
assumption. Bikchandani (1988) and Klemperer (1998) show that one bidder having the advantage of such a
reputation can severely inﬂuence second price or English auctions even when that advantage seems very small.
13MW actually develop a general auction framework that includes any mix of private- and common-value
auctions, allowing most results of this subsection and the next to follow even if productivity had match-speciﬁc
or ﬁrm-speciﬁce l e m e n t s .
14One would expect ﬁrms that were never aggressive to be driven out of the market since they would retain
very few workers and would extract less rent from the workers they did retain. My conjecture is that the only
asymmetric equilibria that would be stable in this setting are those where either the current employer or the
outside employer was always aggressive.
Intuitively, it seems the equilibrium in which the current employer always bids aggressively would be similar
to the one-shot counter-oﬀer bidding structure used more commonly in this literature. Conﬁrming this intution
and examining the question of when one method of bidding for workers would prevail in a market would be
interesting, but are well outside of the scope of this paper.
111.2. Bidding for Workers in Equilibrium
1.2.1. Unemployed Workers
Recall that in t =0an unemployed worker solicits per period wage oﬀers from two ﬁrms, each of
which collects a signal, νfi, f =0 ,1. Firms are assumed to compete for a worker by engaging
in a bidding war.
Applying the result of MW described by equation (2) to this setting, the optimal bid of ﬁrm
0f o rw o r k e ri with experience x is
b(ν0i)=E (µ|Sxi,ν0i,ν1i = ν0i)
where Sx is the market’s information about worker i.I n o t h e r w o r d s , b(ν0i) is the highest wage
ﬁrm 0 is willing to bid for worker i. The optimal bid of ﬁrm 1 follows the same form.
Assume, without loss of generality, that ν0i >ν 1i. Firm 0 wins the bidding and the resulting
wage can be written as (dropping the i subscripts)


























where Vx i st h ev a r i a n c eo fµ conditional on Sx.I n o t h e r w o r d s , ﬁrm 0 hires the worker at
a wage equal to the optimal bid of ﬁr m1 ,w h i c hi sl e s st h a nﬁrm 0’s ex post expectation of
12µi, E (µ|Sx,ν0,ν1). Firm 0 extracts a positive expected ﬁrst-period rent of Vx
σ2
ν+2Vx (ν0 − ν1).
Furthermore, note that paying a wage equal to ﬁrm 1’s optimal bid results in ﬁrm 0 observing
ν1.
1.2.2. Employed Workers
Recall that in each period t of an employment spell a new ﬁrm, f = t+1, that has not previously
encountered the worker draws a signal, νt+1,o ft h ef o r ms p e c i ﬁed in equation (1), and observes
the worker’s wage, wxt
15. Also assume that ﬁrm t +1observes the length of the current
employment spell, t, and the worker’s tenure with her current employer, denoted by τ; but
that these variables contain no information that is not already contained in Sx other than the
precision of the current employer’s information, St, and the value of wxt as a signal. Finally,
assume that once the worker has been interviewed by a ﬁrm it is costless for that ﬁrm to bid for
the worker.
Now assume that the worker treats her current wage, wxt, as a reservation price when a
new ﬁrm is encountered. This imposes some degree of downward wage rigidity, preventing the
current employer from lowering the worker’s wage every time an outside ﬁrm receives a low
signal of her productivity16. When the outside ﬁrm’s optimal bid is below the current wage,
I assume that no bidding takes place, but the outside ﬁrm (costlessly) reveals its optimal bid.
This assumption simpliﬁes the later discussion of employer learning by avoiding issues of what
the current employer would infer if no outside ﬁrm bid for the worker in a given period, but it
15The worker will always have an incentive to reveal her wage to outside ﬁrms. This follows from the well-known
result of MW that the seller in an auction maximizes expected revenue by revealing all relevant information.
16A worker could easily give her employer a reason to respect this reservation wage policy by committing to
quit if the employer deviates. Such a commitment could be motivated either as a punishment mechanism that
is optimal in a repeated game, or out of a sense of fairness.
13does not qualitatively aﬀect my results17.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h eo u t s i d eﬁrm observes the worker’s wage decreases but does not eliminate
the current employer’s informational advantage if τ>1; however, when τ =1 , wxt is the only
bid the current employer has observed. When the outside ﬁrm in any period where τ =1
observes the wage, therefore, information is again symmetric between bidders18.
In later periods of tenure (τ>1) wxt could equal any one of multiple bids, each of which
was made with the employer possessing a diﬀerent amount of information, or it could even equal
the current employer’s expectation (if the expectation fell enough to require the employer to
lower the wage). This is discussed in greater detail in the next subsection where I show that
the information contained in the current wage, wxt, is a subset of the information contained in
St. For now, note that bids will be conditioned on wxt and let ˜ St denote the information in St





in both wxt and ˜ St. In the rest of this subsection I will limit my attention to the later periods
of tenure in which information is asymmetric.
As mentioned above, the equilibrium strategies in this bidding war are unaﬀected by the
current employer having more precise information than the outside ﬁrm. The optimal bid for
each ﬁrm is still the expectation of productivity conditional on its own (private) signal and the
signal of the other ﬁrm being the same, as described by equation (2). The private signal of the
17If no outside ﬁrm bids for a worker in a given period, that worker’s employer would infer that an outside
ﬁrm recieved a signal that was too low to make bidding above wxt proﬁtable. The employer would update its
expectation of the worker’s productivity using this information instead of the actual signal.
18If t =1and τ =1the current employer’s updated signal, S1, will be a weighted average of ν0 and ν1;
h o w e v e r ,t h ew a g ew i l lr e v e a lν1 to ﬁrm 2. The employer’s optimal bid will be
b(S1)=E (µ|Sx,ν1,ν0,ν2 = ν0)
and ﬁrm 2’s optimal bid will be
b(ν2)=E (µ|Sx,ν1,ν0 = ν2,ν2).
If t>1 and τ =1 , then the bids would take a similar form, but ν1 would be replaced with St−1.
14outside ﬁrm is νt+1, as described by equation (1), and that of the current employer is ˜ St,w h i c h
is more precise than νt+1. The following proposition formalizes this equilibrium result.
Proposition 1. The following strategies form an equilibrium of the bidding war in any period
t>1 under the assumptions made above:
1. Firm t +1will bid for the worker up to its optimal bid,
b(νt+1)=E
³
µ|Sx,w xt, ˜ St = νt+1,νt+1
´
,
if b(νt+1) >w xt.O t h e r w i s e , ﬁrm t +1simply reveals νt+1 to the worker.
2. The current employer will bid for the worker up to its optimal bid,
b(St)=E
³




µ|Sx,S t,νt+1 = ˜ St
´
.
Although this proposition is a simple application of a well-known result from MW, Appendix
B contains a proof of Proposition 1 that does not refer to the result of MW. The proof takes
a simple approach, showing that each bidder’s strategy is a best response to the other bidder’s
strategy, and is intended to give readers more intuition about why this result holds even under
asymmetric information.
The result of this bidding process for employed workers is that in each period one of the
following occurs:
1. The outside ﬁrm’s optimal bid is below the current wage, and b(νt+1) is simply re-
vealed to the current employer. The worker’s wage remains unchanged unless wxt >
15E (µ|Sx+1,S t,νt+1), in which case wxt+1 = E (µ|Sx+1,S t,νt+1).
2. The outside ﬁrm bids above the current wage, wxt, but the worker is retained at a higher
wage, wxt+1, equal to the bid of the outside ﬁrm, b(νt+1).
3. The outside ﬁrm bids above the current wage, and the worker is bid away at a wage equal
to the optimal bid of the now former employer, b(St).
It is important to note that the equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 1 will result
in positive expected proﬁts, even for the less well-informed ﬁrm. The ex post expectation of the
worker’s productivity is E (µ|Sx,S t,νt+1) regardless of which ﬁrm wins. Because ﬁrm t+1will
only win the bidding war when νt+1 > ˜ St this ex post expectation will always be greater than
b(St), the wage ﬁrm t +1pays. As St increases in precision, however, the weight put on νt+1
in the ﬁrms’ expectations will decrease, causing the expected proﬁto fﬁrm t +1to decrease as
well.
Because the winning bidder always observes the signal of the losing bidder and each worker is
equally productive in all ﬁrms, all information contained in St is passed on to the new employer
when the worker is bid away. The precision of the current employer’s information, therefore,
depends on the length of the worker’s current employment spell, not on the worker’s tenure with
that ﬁrm.
Allowing match-speciﬁc productivity would likely make the model more realistic, but I main-
tain the assumption that each worker is equally productive in any ﬁrm for two reasons. The
more obvious reason is simplicity. Although my model should be able to incorporate match-
speciﬁc productivity, it would add another level of complexity to employer learning and further
16complicate notation in the paper19.
The more important reason for assuming that all productivity is general is that it highlights
the strengths of the model. It shows that there can be wage growth that reﬂects private
employer learning and mobility between jobs in a setting where previous models of asymmetric
employer learning could not produce either prediction.
1.3. Employer Learning and the Asymmetry of Information
The bidding between ﬁrms described above results in a worker’s employer observing the signals
received by outside ﬁr m sa sl o n ga st h ew o r k e ri sr e t a i n e d . I nt h i ss u b s e c t i o nIﬁrst describe
the current employer’s learning based on the accumulation of these signals. I then discuss the
information contained in the worker’s wage and show that information is asymmetric between
the current employer and an outside ﬁrm whenever τ>1.
1.3.1. The Current Employer’s Learning
For simplicity, it is assumed that the employer receives no other signals of worker productivity,
but the results are unaﬀected if, for example, the current employer also observes signals based on
per period output20. Since all of the signals are identically distributed the current employer’s
updated signal is simply the average of all initial signals received since period 0, when the worker
19The basic result of MW that I apply allows the value of the good being sold (in this case labor) to include any
combination of common and private values. The main complication that allowing some amount of match-speciﬁc
productivity would add is that the information collected by one ﬁrm about a worker’s productivity would be
more informative for that ﬁrm than for any other and the precision of each employer’s information would be
increasing in tenure in addition to spell length. This will be discussed along with empirical evidence in Section
4.
20The ﬁrst version of this paper incorporated signals from per period output. Since worker productivity is
general and the market does not observe the signals of all bidders, excluding such signals simpliﬁes notation and









= µ + ηt,









t+1. The reliability of St obviously improves (σ2
t falls) as the
length of the current employment spell, t, increases and more signals are observed.
Equation 4 applies even when the worker was bid away from another employer after t0 periods













where νt0+1 i st h ei n i t i a ls i g n a lr e c e i v e db yt h en e we m p l o y e r . O n c et h ev a l u eo fSt0 is plugged
in from equation 4, however, this also reduces to equation 4. Because information is transmitted
to a new employer by the bidding process, the precision of the current employer’s information
depends on t, not on tenure (τ).
The current employer’s conditional expectation of productivity for the worker at any spell
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µ. The relative weight put on St in this expectation decreases in
18t h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ee r r o ro nt h eﬁrms’ initial signals, σ2
ν, and increases in the number of periods
since the last nonemployment spell, t21.
1.3.2. Information Provided by a Worker’s Wage.
In the ﬁrst period of tenure (τ =1 )t h eo u t s i d eﬁrm knows that the worker’s wage was the
optimal bid of the previous employer at t − 1 (wxt = b(St−1) if τ =1 ) and information is
symmetric between the bidders. If an outside ﬁrm observes the worker in her second period of
tenure at a job, it learns less from the wage. At τ =2 , wxt would equal b(νt) if the wage was
bid up in the previous period. If the outside ﬁrm in the previous period did not bid up the
worker’s wage, wxt would equal either wxt−1 = b(St−2) or E (µ|Sx,S t), depending on whether
wxt−1 <E(µ|Sx,S t) or not. There is no way for ﬁrm t+1to tell which of these three values wxt
takes on when τ =2because outside ﬁrms do not observe a worker’s history of wage innovations,
or signals received when no bidding occurs. The outside ﬁrm, therefore, cannot infer either St−2
or νt from wxt at τ =2 22.
In general, a worker’s wage is the minimum of the employer’s expectation and an increasing
sequence resulting from the bids of outside ﬁrms:
wxt =m i n
£
E (µ|Sx,S t),¯ b
¤
, (6)
where ¯ b =m a x [ b(St−τ+1),...,b(νt)] (or max[b(ν1),...,b(νt)]) if the wage was never lowered



























22Knowing that the wage was an unknown ﬁrm’s bid does not allow that ﬁrm’s bid to be inferred unless it is
known when that bid was made because the weight a bid puts on a signal changes as t increases and St becomes
more precise.
19ployer last lowered the worker’s wage in period t − ψ. Needless to say, it is diﬃcult at best
to describe the information that an outside ﬁrm t +1could infer from wxt; however, it clearly
contains less information than St whenever τ>123. While the current employer observes all
of the signals contained in St,t h eo u t s i d eﬁrm cannot infer any of them if τ>1.
Fortunately, my model does not require a precise characterization of the information con-





is continuously increasing in wxt and ˜ St. This condition would be met regard-
less of whether outside ﬁrms could interpret equation (6) precisely or just followed a “rule of
thumb” when inferring information about a worker, as long as that rule of thumb was common
knowledge24.
1.4. The Sequence of Wages
As a result of the sequence of bidding wars described above, the worker’s wage, described by
equation (6), increases toward the current employer’s expectation unless the wage has to be
lowered so that employing the worker is not unproﬁtable, at which point wxt = E (µ|Sx,S t).
Once the wage is lowered, it can increase again only if the diﬀerence between E (µ|Sx,S t) and
wxt temporarily increases. Despite such deviations from a monotonic convergence, I establish
in the following proposition that, although wages at t do not generally equal E (µ|Sx,S t),t h e y
converge to E (µ|Sx,S t) as t goes to inﬁnity. This is important because it means that as
the length of uninterrupted employment increases competition from less well-informed ﬁrms
23Even if outside ﬁrms observed the entire history of wage innovations on the current job, they would still
have less information than is in St because it would not observe the signals that were too low to result in a wage
innovation.
24For example, bounded rationality could keep outside ﬁrms from inferring anything from wxt other than a
lower bound for St.
20causes a worker’s wage to resemble her current employer’s expectation more and the market’s
expectation less. As a result, wages reﬂect the private learning of current employers, despite
their informational advantage.
Proposition 2. The sequence of bidding wars for a worker with t periods of uninterrupted em-
ployment creates a sequence of wages, wxt, that converges to the current employer’s conditional
expectation of the worker’s productivity, E (µ|Sx,S t), as t goes to inﬁnity.
Appendix B contains the proof of this proposition. The intuition behind the proof is as
follows: If the worker has not experienced a wage cut during an employment spell, or the wage
cuts took place early in the employment spell, the result follows from a monotonic convergence
argument. If, on the other hand, wage cuts continue to occur later in the employment spell,
the diﬀerence between the wage when the last decrease took place, wxt−γ = E (µ|Sx−γ,S t−γ),
and the current expectation, E (µ|Sx,S t), converges to zero.
Proposition 2 shows that competition from less well-informed ﬁrms forces employers in my
model to raise the wages of workers toward their expectations of the workers’ productivity. Since
an employer’s expectation converges to the worker’s productivity, the worker’s wage will also
converge to her productivity. In the next section, I show that this implication is testable using
an extension of the test of public learning developed by AP. In short, my model predicts that
wages will reﬂect evidence of employer learning as the length of the employment spell increases.
Section 4 presents the estimation results from the empirical test of this prediction.
Proposition 2 also makes an important contribution to the theoretical literature on asymmet-
ric employer learning by showing that wages can grow toward the employer’s expectation even
in the absence of promotions or other publicly observable signals. Two workers with exactly
21the same value of Sx in this model will not generally have the same wage. The inability of
previous asymmetric learning models to produce this result is one of the main criticisms of the
literature made by Gibbons and Waldman (1999).
The model in this paper is also consistent with some of the important and well known
empirical ﬁndings that have motivated much of the previous work on asymmetric employer
learning and careers in organizations. For example, wages will rise on average with seniority in
my model, even though productivity does not, as noted by the studies of Medoﬀ and Abraham
(1980, 1981) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b). This happens because wages
on a job start out being lower than the employer’s expectation of productivity but are bid up
toward the employer’s expectation. Since the employer’s information is based on a sequence of
randomly drawn, unbiased signals and the worker’s ability is ﬁx e di nt h em o d e l ,t h ee m p l o y e r ’ s
expectations will appear not to increase on average as tenure (or experience or employment spell
duration) increases. The wage, on the other hand, will be bid up toward that expectation as
long as the worker remains continuously employed25.
The model also incorporates real wage cuts, but predicts that they will not occur as often as
wage increases, as documented by BGH. Because wages are typically lower than the worker’s
expected productivity and are only reduced when it is necessary to keep them from exceeding
the worker’s expected productivity, wage cuts will occur less frequently in my model than in the
public employer learning model of FG or other learning models in which wage equals expected
productivity. Wage cuts will occur, but not every time an employer receives a negative signal
25Cases in which tenure (as opposed to spell length) is unusually long might be exceptions to this case.
Without the addition of match-speciﬁc productivity or an increase in human capital exceptionally long tenure
in this model would likely be due to high positive errors on initial signals that would then be followed by falling
wages. At average levels of tenure, however, the aﬀect of wages being bid up toward the current employer’s
unbiased expectation would still cause wages to rise with tenure.
22about the worker.
Finally, this model has implications for worker mobility that could be compared to other
literatures in labor economics, and these implications deserve a more formal treatment in future
research. One of the more intuitive implications for mobility is that the average wage increase
associated with job-to-job transitions should decrease as the spell length increases. Jovanovic
(1984) produces a similar result with increases in tenure instead of spell length, but the reasoning
behind the results is diﬀerent. In his model, workers become more willing to leave for a lower
wage as tenure increases due to higher relative option values of new jobs. In my model, the
wage increases are due to the diﬀerence between the employer’s expectation of the worker’s
productivity and the wage the worker is paid, which is decreasing on average as spell length
increases26.
2. Estimation of Wage Equations under Asymmetric Learning
The prediction that wages converge to the current employer’s expectation of the worker’s pro-
ductivity, despite the employer’s private information, allows this model to be tested using a
simple extension of the work of AP. When all learning is public, as in AP, wages equal expected
productivity and become more correlated with the worker’s actual productivity as experience
accumulates and the market’s expectation becomes more accurate. In my model of asymmetric
employer learning, wages become more closely related to actual productivity as the length of the
current employment spell increases due to both the wage converging to the current employer’s
expectation (see Proposition 2) and that expectation becoming more accurate as the employer
26Eeckhout (2005) develops a model that is very similar to mine with the express intent of comparing its results
under general human capital to the results other models achieve under match-speciﬁc productivity.
23accumulates more private information. In either case, when the wage becomes more correlated
with the worker’s actual productivity, it becomes more correlated with variables that are cor-
related with productivity but diﬃcult for employers to observe and less correlated with easily
observed variables.
Because the model developed in the previous section includes a term that captures the
market’s learning, the wage regression developed in this section tests for both public learning
and asymmetric learning. Any learning that is public should result in evidence of learning over
experience. On the other hand, evidence of learning over the length of the current employment
spell suggests asymmetric learning27.
In what follows, Z denotes a vector of easily observed variables, such as education or race,
that are correlated with productivity. I assume that Z is related to productivity through a
linear function, f (Z)=Zδ, such that
Zδ = µ + ζ;





and neither f (Z) nor σ2
Z varies by labor market experience, the length of
the current employment spell, or tenure. I assume that Z, δ,a n dσ2
z are all common knowledge
in the labor market. Adding these easily observed variables to my model, therefore, in no way
aﬀects the results discussed above. They were left out of the discussion of the theoretical model
for the sake of notational simplicity.
To see how wages evolve, ﬁrst recall that a worker’s wage, wxt,i sa l w a y sl e s st h a no re q u a l
27Recall that experience and the length of the current employment spell diﬀer in this model due to the as-
sumption of exogenous job destruction; however, any assumption that resulted in periods of unemployment would
produce the same result.
24to the current employer’s conditional expectation. On average, the diﬀerence between wxt and
E (µ|Z,Sx,S t) decreases with the length of the current employment spell, but this diﬀerence
does not decrease monotonically because of the random nature of the signals. At the same
time, the wage moves further away from the wage earned when the employment spell began,
wx01 = E (µ|Z,Sx0,ν0 = ν1,ν1),w h e r ex0 = x−t i st h ew o r k e r ’ se x p e r i e n c ep r i o rt ot h ec u r r e n t
employment spell and ν1 is the signal received by the ﬁrm that was outbid at the beginning of
the employment spell. More formally, the expected wage can be written as
E (wxt)=[ 1− ρ(t)] · E (µ|Z,Sx0,ν0 = ν1,ν1)+ρ(t) · E (µ|Z,Sx,S t), (7)
where ρ(t) is a monotonically increasing, diﬀerentiable function such that ρ(1) = 0 and ρ(t) → 1
as t →∞ .N o t e t h a t ρ(t)is a function of the ability of outside ﬁrms to compete for the worker:
the more reliable the signals of outside ﬁrms, the faster ρ(t) converges to 1. By expanding the
expectations and recalling that Sx = µ + ηx, St = µ + ηt,a n dν1 = µ + e1, the expected wage
can be written as a weighted average of the population mean, m; an easily observed variable,
Z; actual productivity, µ; and an error term:
E (wxt)=Bmm + BZ (Zδ)+Bxtµ + φ
0. (8)
(See Appendix C for a more complete description of equation 8.)
Due to the public component of learning, Bm and Bz are decreasing in experience while
Bxt is increasing in experience. More important in the current context, my model implies
that Bxt increases with t and Bm and BZ decrease with t. (The relevant derivatives are
25presented in Appendix C.) This follows because the current employer’s expectation of the
worker’s productivity converges to µ as t increases, while competition from less well-informed
ﬁrms in the market causes the worker’s wage to converge to that expectation as t increases.
Since the worker’s actual productivity obviously can’t be observed, my estimation instead
uses a variable that is correlated with productivity but is unlikely to be observed by employers,
as do AP and FG. Consider a variable, V ,t h a ti sc o r r e l a t e dw i t hp r o d u c t i v i t ya n do b s e r v e db y
the econometrician, but is not observed by the market. Assume the variance of V , σ2
V ,a n dt h e
covariance of V and productivity, σ2
Vµ, do not vary with experience or employment spell length.
Also assume that V is uncorrelated with ζ, ηx and ηt, the error terms in f (Z) and the updated
signals. When µ is replaced by V in equation (8), the expectation of the OLS estimate of Bxt














, does not vary with experience or employment spell length, it does
not interfere with the model’s basic predictions.
In the actual estimation, I approximate the coeﬃcients in equation (8) with linear interactions
of x and t, resulting in a wage equation of the form
wxt = C + Zγ0 + Z · xγx + Z · tγt + VB 0 + V · xBx + V · tBt + φ
0
xt, (9)
where C is a vector containing a constant and the experience and spell length terms28.A n y
learning that is public results in γx being negative and Bx being positive. If there is asymmetric
28The eﬀects of the interactions of m with t and x obviously can’t be seperated from any eﬀects t and x have
on the wage directly.
26learning, γt will be negative and Bt will be positive.
It is important to note, however, that the predictions for the coeﬃcients on easily observed
variables only hold when a hard-to-observe variable is included in the regression29.W i t h o u t t h e
interactions of the hard-to-observe variable, employer learning would predict no change over time
in the coeﬃcients on easily observed variables. On the other hand, other factors could cause
the eﬀects of race or education, for example, to vary with labor market experience. Since these
other factors could swamp the eﬀects of employer learning, I compare estimates from regressions
that restrict Bx and Bt to be zero to unrestricted estimates of equation (9). Although other
factors could determine the sign of γx and γt, these variables should nonetheless fall (become
less positive or more negative) when the interactions of the hard-to-observe variable are added
to the regression.
3. Data
The regression estimates presented in this paper use data from the 2000 release of the NLSY.
The NLSY data have two key advantages for the analysis in this paper. First, the data contain
variables, such as AFQT scores, that are likely to be correlated with productivity but also
diﬃcult for employers to observe. Second, the data provide a large panel that includes detailed
information on worker employment histories. This work history data allows the measurement
of both actual work experience and employment spell length.
Employment spell length is measured using data on weekly labor force status. An employ-
ment spell ends if the worker is not employed during a week and her last job ended with an
29This was the major result that distinguished the work of AP from Farber and Gibbons (1996) and allowed
them to test for “rational stereotyping” based on race and education.
27involuntary termination (ﬁring, etc.), or if the worker is not working for at least two weeks in
a row and neither returns to work at her last job nor reports making a job-to-job transition.
Each employment spell then begins counting weeks worked after the previous spell ended. Em-
ployment spells are thought of as continuing through periods of nonwork after which the worker
returns to the same employer, since it is unlikely that an employer would lose information gained
about a worker when the worker, for example, takes a few weeks of leave. I experimented with
other deﬁnitions of an employment spell, but the estimation results were always qualitatively
similar30.
I also create a measure of tenure that is consistent with my measure of employment spell
length. The tenure variable that is included in the NLSY counts all weeks between the start
of the job and either the date the job ended or the interview date, regardless of whether the
worker was employed or not. Since my measure of spell length only counts weeks working, I
deﬁne tenure at a job as weeks worked between the start date and either the end date or the
interview date. Even though this could count some weeks in which the worker was employed
by other ﬁrms, the resulting tenure variable never exceeds the spell length, unlike the standard
tenure variable in the NLSY31.
The data used for estimation are restricted to produce a sample of workers who are both
committed to the labor market and likely to be paid based on their performance. Attention is
limited to men who have left school for the ﬁnal time by the beginning of the job in question,
30In preliminary estimation I deﬁned a spell as ending every time the worker went at least two weeks without
working and obtained qualitatively similar results to those presented here. I also tried deﬁning employment
spells as ending when the worker had longer spells of nonemployment without noticing qualitatively diﬀerent
results. In all cases, weeks of uncertain labor force status were treated as periods of nonemployment.
31The tenure measure I create is highly correlated with the standard tenure measure, with a highly signiﬁcant
Pearson correlation coeﬃcient of 0.977. Furthermore, my tenure measure and the standard NLSY measure are
similarly correlated with spell length, with signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcients of tenure and spell length in either
case falling between 0.77 and 0.78.
28are not in the military and have completed at least 12 years of schooling32. I use observations
from the CPS job in each year if its hourly wage (in 1987 dollars) is between $2 and $200, it
involves between 35 and 100 hours worked per week, and there are no missing values for any
of the key variables (not counting tenure). I exclude 2537 observations of workers who had
been out of the labor market at least 25% of their career up to that interview. Finally, I
impose two restrictions intended to improve the reliability of my experience measures: I drop
12 observations from people who had more than 4 years of potential experience in 1979, and I
drop 2825 observations in which actual experience is calculated to exceed potential experience by
more than one year33. Eligible observations are drawn from all years of the survey (1979-2000).
The resulting sample has 30,374 valid observations for 3,677 men.
AFQT scores are adjusted by the age at which the test was taken. Following AP, I subtract
the average percentile score for the individual’s age group from the individual’s score and divide
the diﬀerence by the standard deviation of AFQT for that age group. This results in an AFQT
measure with a standard normal distribution in the population of workers in my sample (but
not the full panel) that adjusts for AFQT scores being higher on average for individuals who
were tested at an older age.
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics for my sample. No sample weighting is used for
these or any other estimates in this paper. The average hourly wage, in 1987 dollars, is $9.88.
Almost 70% of the sample is white and just over 76% resides in an urban area. The average
worker has completed 13.25 years of schooling. The average worker has a tenure on the CPS
32I experimented with using the deﬁnitions of labor market entry used by FG and AP, as well as extending the
sample to include men who had complete 8 years or more of education and found qualitatively similar results in
each case.
33This last group appears to consist mostly of people who had a missing interview as they transitioned from
school, or who reported an average of more than 52 weeks worked per year for multiple consecutive years.
29job of 3.6 years, but has been continuously employed for 5.1 years. The average worker has 18.8
years of potential experience and 15.2 years of actual experience at the 2000 interview. Over
all years in the sample, the average potential experience is 10 years, while the average actual
experience is 8 years.
4. Estimation Results
The estimation results presented in this section are consistent with my model of asymmetric
employer learning. For the sake of comparison, this section ﬁrst presents results from regressions
estimated under the assumptions of a pure public learning model before presenting the tests of
asymmetric employer learning. The results suggest that a signiﬁcant portion of the evidence
of learning observed in tests of public learning may actually be due to asymmetric employer
learning. Despite the current employers’ informational advantage, the eﬀects of private learning
are reﬂected in the wage regressions at least as strongly as the eﬀects of public learning.
All of the results presented below are from regressions that include dummy variables for urban
residence and year. Following Farber and Gibbons (1996), interactions of the year dummies
and years of schooling are included to allow the return to education to vary by year. I use
quartic polynomials in the experience measure and (in the asymmetric learning equations) spell
length to control for the inﬂuence of x and t on wages34. Years of schooling and a dummy
variable for being white are the easily observed (Z) variables, and the adjusted AFQT score is
the hard-to-observe (V ) variable35.
34In equation (11), the eﬀects of x and t are incorporated in C and the error term, φ
0
xt, which is a nonlinear
function of both.
35The use of testing by ﬁr m sd o e sn o ts u g g e s tt h a tA F Q Ti sn o ti t s e l fd i ﬃcult to observe. Even employers
that give their own tests will not actually observe the AFQT score. Their test will be another noisy signal of
worker productivity that will be included in Stj. The results presented in this and other papers suggest that
30Table 2 presents results from wage regressions estimated under the assumptions of a public
learning model. The two columns on the left present OLS results with experience measured as
potential experience. The two columns on the right present IV results with experience measured
as actual experience and potential experience used as an instrument. It is important to use an
instrument in this case because actual experience is likely correlated with ability, which could
cause bias in the coeﬃcients on experience and its interactions. If AFQT only captures part of
a worker’s ability or is a noisy measure of ability, then part of the eﬀect of ability on wages could
be picked up by actual experience. Furthermore, actual experience could be used by employers
to learn about a worker’s ability. In any case, potential experience is correlated with actual
experience, but should not be correlated with ability, making it a valid instrument.
Both the OLS and IV estimates in Table 2 support the existence of public learning. Most of
the evidence comes from the interactions of experience (either potential or actual) with AFQT
scores. AFQT has a large eﬀect on wages when experience interactions are not included [1.05
(0.09) for OLS, 0.96 (0.09) for IV], but most of this eﬀect is due to wages becoming more
correlated with AFQT over time. When experience interactions are added, the initial eﬀect
of AFQT falls to 0.45 (0.12) in the OLS and 0.39 (0.12) in the IV regressions, a statistically
signiﬁcant decrease in both cases. The coeﬃcient on AFQT × t h ee x p e r i e n c em e a s u r ei s
signiﬁcantly positive at 0.060 (0.012) in the OLS regressions and even larger [0.070 (0.015)]
in the IV regressions. As predicted, coeﬃcients on the easily observed variables interacted
with experience always become more negative (or less positive) when AFQT × the experience
employer-provided testing does not allow employers to observe AFQT scores. If it did, AFQT would not behave
l i k eah a r d - t o - o b s e r v ev a r i a b l ei nw a g er e g r e s s i o n s .
AP also use father’s education as a hard-to-observe variable. Because parental education might aﬀect pro-
ductivity in ways that are observable, like language development, I do not use it in this paper. Preliminary
estimation (not shown) supports this decision.
31measure is added, as predicted, but the change is never signiﬁcant.
Moving to the test of the asymmetric learning model, Table 3 presents results from OLS
wage regressions that use potential experience as the experience measure. The results support
my model, with most of the evidence again coming from AFQT scores. The results for grade
completed and the white dummy variable are always consistent with both public and private
employer learning, but are never signiﬁcant. As before, AFQT scores have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on wages, but most of that inﬂuence is due to wages becoming more correlated with ability over
time. When the interactions of AFQT with x and t are added, the coeﬃcient on AFQT itself
falls signiﬁcantly from 0.988 (0.090) to 0.397 (0.120). More importantly, the coeﬃcient on
AFQT × employment spell length in column III is 0.054 (0.022). The coeﬃcient on AFQT ×
potential experience is slightly smaller but also signiﬁcant at 0.031 (0.015).
To put these coeﬃcients on AFQT in more concrete terms, a one standard deviation increase
in the adjusted AFQT score increases hourly wages by $0.27 more after ﬁve years of continuous
employment than at the beginning of an employment spell. By comparison, an extra 5 years
of potential experience raises the eﬀect of the same change in AFQT by $0.15. Despite the
informational asymmetry, the current employer’s private learning appears to aﬀect wages at
least as much as the market’s public learning as long as the worker remains employed.
The IV regressions presented in Table 4 use instruments for employment spell length and
its interactions, in addition to instruments for actual experience and it’s interactions. The
length of an employment spell could contain information about worker productivity, just as
actual experience could36,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcients on spell length and its interactions could be
36For example, a worker who has been continuously employed for a long time could be more able or disciplined
than an otherwise similar worker whose labor market experience consists of a series of short employment spells.
32biased for the same reason as those on actual experience and it’s interactions. The length of
an employment spell could also be correlated with a match-speciﬁc component that aﬀects the
wage on the current job for the same reasons that higher tenure on a job could be37.
In an attempt to create an instrument that is not correlated with information about the
worker’s productivity or a match-speciﬁc component of the wage, I regress the length of the
current employment spell on the worker’s career average spell length, actual experience, the
total duration of the current job, and a dummy variable for missing values of duration. As long
as these variables control for all components of employment spell length that are correlated with
productivity38, and duration of the current job controls for any match-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t st h a t
are correlated with the residual in the wage equation, the residual from this regression is a valid
instrument for employment spell length39. The interactions of this residual can also be used as
instruments for the interactions of spell duration.
The results from this IV estimation again support my model. Looking at column III in Table
4, the coeﬃcient on AFQT × employment spell duration is 0.084 (0.034), while that on AFQT ×
actual experience is only 0.027 (0.025). According to these estimates, a one standard deviation
increase in the adjusted AFQT score increases hourly wages by $0.41 more after ﬁve years of
continuous employment than at the beginning of an employment spell. During those ﬁve years
of continuous employment, the market’s public learning would increase the eﬀect of that change
37A high match value would make the job more valuable, resulting in both higher wages and a higher expected
job duration. Since longer employment spells are often the result of greater tenure on the job, employment spell
length could also be reﬂecting match-speciﬁc components of the wage. See, for example, Altonji and Shakotko
(1987) or Abraham and Farber (1987) for more detailed discussions endogenous tenure.
38This should include anything that the market learns about productivity from observing spell duration,
including things like "discipline." If more disciplined workers have longer spell lengths, then the career average
spell length should capture that.
39The R2 for this ﬁrst-stage regression is 0.78. The estimated coeﬃcients are as follows: Constant, -1.93
(0.06); Average Spell Duration, 0.48 (0.01); Actual Experience, 0.35 (0.01); Duration of Current Job, 0.51 (0.01);
and Job Duration Missing, 1.69 (0.16).
33in AFQT by a statistically insigniﬁcant $0.13. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient on AFQT again falls
signiﬁcantly, from 0.934 (0.094) to 0.276 (0.133), when the interactions of AFQT with experience
and spell duration are added. As in all of my estimation, the interactions of grade and race
with experience and spell length have eﬀects that are consistent with both public and private
learning; however, the change in their coeﬃcients when the interactions with AFQT are added
is never signiﬁcant.
The model presented in the current paper implies that the private information of one em-
ployer is passed on to the next whenever a worker is bid away by a new employer. This
transmission of information is the result of ﬁrms engaging in bidding wars for the worker’s ser-
vices combined with the assumption that worker productivity is not match-speciﬁc. If employers
do not bid for workers through bidding wars, or some other mechanism that allows the winning
bidder to observe the bid of the losing bidder, then little or no information will be transmitted
between employers. If match-speciﬁc productivity is important, then the previous employer’s
ultimate bid will be less meaningful for the new employer because it serves only as a signal of
general productivity, with the match-speciﬁc component acting as an additional error term.
To consider this issue further, I divide time in the current spell into tenure with the current
employer and time worked in the spell with other employers. If only part of the previous
employers’ information is transmitted to the new employer, our intuition suggests there will be
more evidence of employer learning with tenure on the current job than with time worked in
the spell with other employers, because part of the information accumulated by the previous
employer(s) was lost when the worker took the current job. Of course, if no information is
transmitted from one employer to the next, the model would predict only evidence of learning
34over experience and tenure, as in the recent paper by Schoenberg (2004)40.I n e i t h e r o f t h e s e
cases, the regression estimates I’ve presented so far might be providing evidence of employer
learning with the length of the employment spell simply because employment spell length and
tenure are highly correlated.
I examine this possibility in Table 5 and ﬁnd no evidence that would lead one to reject my
model’s implication that private information accumulated by one employer is transmitted to
the next when workers move from one job to another. Table 5 repeats the analysis of Table 3
with spell length divided into time in the spell before the current job (Spell-Tenure) and tenure.
The coeﬃcient on AFQT x (Spell-Tenure) is 0.071 (0.032), providing signiﬁcant evidence that is
consistent with information being transmitted between employers in a job-to-job transition. The
coeﬃcient on AFQT x Tenure is also signiﬁcantly positive [0.047 (0.026)]; however, the fact that
it is not larger than the coeﬃcient on AFQT interacted with (Spell-Tenure) give us no reason
to believe that the transmission of information between employers is limited by match-speciﬁc
productivity or diﬀerent bidding mechanisms41. In an alternative speciﬁcation (not shown)
I included interactions with both the full spell length and tenure, and found no statistically
signiﬁcant evidence of learning over tenure but still found signiﬁcant evidence consistent with
learning over spell duration42.
Finally, it is important to note that my estimation, like that in AP or FG, could be aﬀected
40Schoenberg (2004) presents a two-period model in which outside ﬁrms bid against the perfectly-informed
current employer, who makes a single counter-oﬀer in the second period. This bidding is proﬁtable for the outside
ﬁrm, and results in the current employer oﬀering a wage that incorporates some of its private information, under
the assumption that there is a transitory nonpecuniary value associated with each job.
41Results from IV speciﬁcations were qualitatively similar.
42I also estimated speciﬁcations that only include interactions with experience and tenure but found no statis-
tically signiﬁcant evidence of learning over tenure, although the coeﬃcients had the predicted signs. Schoenberg
(2004) reports evidence of learning over tenure from wage regressions, but her only signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on
AFQT x Tenure comes from a speciﬁcation that does not allow the eﬀect of education or race to vary with
tenure, making it unclear whether or not AFQT x Tenure is picking up part of the eﬀects of Grade or Race x
Tenure.
35by human capital accumulation if AFQT scores are correlated with the returns to training.
Following AP, I repeated my OLS and IV estimation with measures of both current and accu-
mulated employer-provided training added to the regressions. Although the measure of training
in the NLSY is far from perfect43, one would at least expect controlling for training to reduce
the evidence of learning if that evidence is biased upward by a correlation between training and
ability. The results of the regressions with training added (not shown) indicate that controlling
for training further reduces the evidence of public learning but has no noticeable eﬀect on the
evidence of asymmetric learning.
5. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
This paper develops and tests a model of asymmetric employer learning that relaxes the infor-
mational assumptions of most papers in the literature and allows ﬁrms to compete for workers
through bidding wars. As a result, outside ﬁrms can proﬁtably compete for an employed
worker, despite the current employer’s informational advantage. In contrast to earlier work in
this literature, workers in this model can be bid away from their employer by less well-informed
ﬁrms even though there is no match- or ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity. Furthermore, competition
from outside ﬁrms forces the current employer to raise the worker’s wages toward the employer’s
expectation of that worker’s productivity, resulting in diﬀerent wages for workers who have the
same publicly observable characteristics.
This convergence of wages to the current employer’s expectation allows the model to be
43The NLSY does not ask about training that went on for a month or less until 1988. I use observations from
1988 on to predict training in earlier years, as do AP. This prediction is based on a probit estimate using a
ﬂexible function of grade, AFQT, experience, spell length and tenure, as well as controls for urban residence and
the ﬁrst occupation after leaving school.
36tested empirically. The model implies that wages reﬂect evidence of public learning as experi-
ence increases and asymmetric learning as the length of the employment spell length increases.
Extending the work of Altonji and Pierret (2000), I develop a simple test of the model that
requires only the estimation of basic wage regressions using data from the NLSY. The resulting
estimation suggests that both public learning and private, asymmetric learning aﬀect wages. In
fact, competition from outside ﬁrms appears to be strong enough to cause the employer’s private
learning to aﬀect wages during an employment spell at least as much as the market’s learning.
Finally, I estimate a version of these wage regressions that tests the transmission of information
between employers that is implied by the model, and ﬁnd no evidence that contradicts that
implication.
This paper opens multiple avenues for future research. First, the basic framework of this
model could be used to revisit issues discussed in the literature on task assignment. The model
demonstrates how competition from less well-informed ﬁrms can reduce the current employer’s
ability to pay the worker less than her expected productivity. Such competition would also
reduce the incentive for employers to keep workers in lower paying jobs in order to avoid signalling
the worker’s ability to outside ﬁrms. Many of the results of previous models would be preserved;
however, promotions would have diﬀerent eﬀects at diﬀerent points in a worker’s career. Such a
combined model could provide new testable implications as well as a means of explaining various
empirical observations made previously about workers’ careers in ﬁrms.
The model also has more implications for wage and especially employment dynamics than I
have developed here. Developing these implications more completely could lead to interesting
comparisons with other models, and possibly produce additional empirical tests. This eﬀort
37might be aided by embedding this model into a basic search framework44. Adding a fuller
model of job search would provide a more realistic description of unemployment than the model
has in its current form, and would allow an analysis of how employer learning aﬀected search
intensity, for example.
Finally, the model developed in this paper could provide an interesting framework for further
work on labor market discrimination. Both Oettinger (1996) and Milgrom and Oster (1987)
develop models of statistical discrimination that exploit asymmetric learning, while Altonji and
Pierret (2000) and Pinkston (2003) examine empirical evidence of diﬀerent types of statistical
discrimination in public learning frameworks45. Although the results in this paper provide weak
support (if any) for a “rational stereotyping” form of statistical discrimination, it is possible that
black and white men diﬀer in the eﬀect asymmetric learning has on their wages relative to public
learning. Exploring that possibility could provide new insights into how discrimination arises
and why it persists.
44Postel-Vinay and Robin (2000) incorporate a bidding framework that resembles a private-value English
auction between ﬁrms that diﬀer in productivity. The bidding and informational structure of this model should
not be much more diﬃcult to incorporate into a search model than theirs was, and the model could have interesting
implications for both wage dispersion and employment dynamics.
45The term “statistical discrimination” is used to refer to two diﬀerent types of discrimination. “Rational
stereotyping” assumes that employers illegally use race or gender as a signal of worker ability. “Screening
discrimination” assumes that employers are less able to evaluate the ability of workers from one group than
another. Altonji and Pierret (2000) look at rational stereotyping. Pinkston (2003), Oettinger (1996) and
Milgrom and Oster (1987) consider screening discrimination.
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40A. The English Auction Equilibrium
This appendix discusses the optimal bid in a two-player English auction, as developed in
MW. The focus will be on the assumptions they make and how those assumptions nest the
assumptions of this paper.
The relevant assumptions from MW are:
1. (Assumption 2) The value of the object to each bidder is nonnegative, continuous in its
variables, and nondecreasing in its variables. As long as the distribution of µ is such that
ﬁrms never believe that a worker will have negative productivity, this assumption is very
easily met by the distributional assumptions of my model.
2. (Assumption 3) The expectation of each bidder’s value for the object is ﬁnite. This is
obviously true in my model
3. (Assumption 5) The signals received by bidders and the other variables that inﬂuence the
value of the object (µi in my model) are “aﬃliated”. Roughly speaking, two variables
are aﬃliated if a high value of one makes it more likely that the other has a high value.
Klemperer (1999) explains aﬃliation as being equivalent to local correlation everywhere.
This is guaranteed by my assumption that all signals equal µi plus a mean-zero standard
error. MW show that variables are aﬃliated if the distribution of µi conditional on those
variables satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio property.
The other main assumptions that MW make (1 and 4) relate to the symmetry of the auction
and are not required for this second-price or English auction equilibrium to hold. (These
assumptions are only used for their discussion of ﬁrst-price auctions.)
As mentioned earlier in this paper, Theorem 6 in MW describes an equilibrium in the second-
price case. (When there are two players, English and second-price auctions are equivalent.) The
theorem states that the (strategically symmetric) equilibrium is the point where every bidder bids
her value of the object conditional on her signal and the signal of the next highest bidder being
the same. The proof of this theorem is a fairly straightforward maximization problem, with
the bidder in question maximizing over the value to be substituted in place of the (unobserved)
signal of the next highest bidder. The proof requires that the distribution of one bidder’s signal
conditional on another’s is continuous, but it does not require the distributions to be symmetric.
B. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
B . 1 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
I ﬁrst show that the strategy of ﬁrm t+1described in the proposition is a best response to the
current employer bidding up to b(St). If the current employer bids up to b(St) and ﬁrm t +1
outbids it, ﬁrm t +1will observe St through b(St) and it’s proﬁti np e r i o dt +1 will be its ex
post expectation minus b(St):
πt+1 = E
³




µ|Sx,w xt, ˜ St,νt+1 = ˜ St
´
.
41Obviously, πt+1 > 0 for every νt+1 > ˜ St,a n dπt+1 < 0 for every νt+1 < ˜ St. Recall that all of
these expectations, including b(νt+1), are continuous and increasing in all of their terms.
For any ﬁnal bid b<b (νt+1), there are values of ˜ St such that νt+1 > ˜ St (πt+1 > 0)a n d
b(St) >b ; thus, setting the ﬁnal bid below b(νt+1) lowers the probability that ﬁrm t +1will
win the bidding at a positive proﬁt. For any ﬁnal bid b>b (νt+1), there are values of ˜ St
such that νt+1 < ˜ St (πt+1 < 0)a n db(St) <b ;t h u s ,i fﬁrm t +1decides to bid above b(νt+1)
it introduces the possibility of winning at a negative proﬁt without increasing it’s chances of
earning a positive proﬁt. Finally, note that when b(νt+1) <w xt ﬁrm t +1can never earn a
positive proﬁt from bidding. No course of action will make it better oﬀer than accepting zero
proﬁt and costlessly revealing its signal. Therefore, ﬁrm t+1’s best response to b(St) is to bid
for the worker up to b(νt+1),i fb(νt+1) >w xt;a n ds i m p l yr e v e a lνt+1 to the worker otherwise.
I now need to show that bidding up to b(St) is the current employer’s best response to ﬁrm
t +1bidding up to b(vt+1) when b(νt+1) >w xt. If the current employer wins the bidding war
in this case, it will observe νt+1 and it’s proﬁt will be
πt+1 = E
³




µ|Sx,w xt, ˜ St = νt+1,νt+1
´
.
The argument here follows the same logic that was used above: If the current employer sets it’s
ultimate bid below b(St) it will fail to win the worker’s services in some cases that would have
yielded positive proﬁts. If the current employer decides that it will stop bidding at some point
above b(St), it introduces the possibility of winning at a negative proﬁt. ¥
B . 2 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
First note that the wage, wxt, as described in equation (6), is bounded above by E (µ|Sx,S t),
and limt→∞ E (µ|Sx,S t)=µ.
Consider the case in which there are no wage cuts ﬁrst. If the worker is at her ﬁrst and only
job of the employment spell,
¯ b =m a x[ b(ν1),...,b(νt)].
The wage then is a monotonically increasing sequence that is bounded above by E (µ|Sx,S t).
Since E (µ|Sx,S t) is itself bounded, the monotone convergence theorem implies that the wage
converges to E (µ|Sx,S t). Furthermore, it is easy to see that the wage cannot converge to any-
thing less than E (µ|Sx,S t) because whenever wxt <E(µ|Sx,S t) there is a positive probability
that another ﬁrm will place a bid between wxt and E (µ|Sx,S t). Therefore, in this case wxt
converges to E (µ|Sx,S t).
If the worker has had previous employers during this employment spell,
¯ b =m a x[ b(St−τ+1),...,b(νt)].
The same monotonic convergence argument used above applies here. Furthermore, for any τ,
|E (µ|Sx,S t) − b(St−τ+1)| → 0 as t →∞
because b(St−τ+1)=E
³
µ|Sx−τ+1,S t−τ+1,νt−τ+2 = ˜ St−τ+1
´
and E (µ|Sx,S t) converges to µ;
thus, as job changes occur later in the employment spell, the starting wages on those jobs also
42converge to E (µ|Sx,S t).
The more interesting case is when the wage is not monotonically increasing; however, even
when there are wage cuts there are still two eﬀects ensuring that wxt converges to E (µ|Sx,S t).
First, if the wage cut took place in a ﬁxed period in the past and the wage is not lowered again,
then the monotonic convergence argument used above again applies to the sequence of wages
that follows that period. Second, if these wage cuts continue to occur as t increases, convergence
still occurs because
|E (µ|Sx,S t) − E (µ|Sx−ψ,S t−ψ)| → 0 as t →∞
for any ﬁxed ψ.( T h i s f o l l o w s f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t E (µ|Sx,S t) is a convergent sequence.) ¥
C. Equation 8 and its Coeﬃcients.
With Z added to the model the current employer’s expectation of the worker’s productivity is
simply


































Z. The ﬁrst wage the worker was paid in the current employment spell is


































Inserting these expectations, equation (7) can be rewritten as























+ρ(t) · [βmm + βZ (Zδ)+βxSx + βtSt].
Recalling that Sx = µ + ηx, St = µ + ηt,a n dν1 = µ + e1, this equation is easily simpliﬁed as
E (wxt)=Bmm + BZ (Zδ)+Bxtµ + φ
0, where (8)





D0 + ρ(t) · βm,
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+ ρ(t) · (βx + βt), and
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+ ρ(t) · (βxηx + βtηt).
43The rest of this section will show the derivatives of Bm, BZ and Bxt in equation (8) in order
to support the conclusions of Section 1.
C.1. Derivatives with Respect to Experience
The weight put on individual productivity, Bxt, is increasing and the weight on the population
mean and easily observed variables, is decreasing in experience due to public learning:
∂Bm
∂x










































































































































The ﬁrst term in ∂Bxt


















D2 > 0. Therefore, ∂Bxt
∂x > 0.
C.2. Derivatives with Respect to Employment Spell Length
Under asymmetric learning with some level of competition from outside ﬁrms, Bxt increases














































































Intuitively, the ﬁrst term is positive because the current employer’s expectation is more corre-
lated with the worker’s productivity than was her initial wage in the current employment spell;
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45Table 1.  Summary Statistics*.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real Hourly 9.881 6.517 2.002 192.054
   Wage
Highest Grade 13.253 1.873 12 20
   Completed
White 0.699 0.459 0 1
Black 0.258 0.437 0 1
Normalized -0.104 0.982 -2.018 2.361
   AFQT
Employment 5.134 4.464 0 23.019
   Spell Length
Tenure 3.608 3.760 0 22.846
Potential 10.037 5.311 0 25
   Experience
Experience 8.029 4.985 0.019 24.615
Pot. Experience 18.827 3.167 9 25
  in 2000
Experience 15.158 5.055 0.231 24.615
  in 2000
Urban 0.762 0.426 0 1
*Notes:  Wages are in 1987 dollars.  Spell length, tenure and the experience variables are measured in years.  There are 30374 
observations except for Tenure (29639 nonmissing), and the experience measures in 2000 (2150).Table 2.  Coefficient Estimates under Public Learning.
OLS and IV Estimates of Wage Regressions*.
OLS IV
II III I
Grade 0.930 1.079 0.963 1.106
(0.135) (0.136) (0.141) (0.142)
Grade x Experience -0.002 -0.017 0.003 -0.015
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023)
White -0.534 -0.006 -0.611 -0.106
(0.193) (0.199) (0.191) (0.197)
White x Experience 0.137 0.085 0.153 0.089
(0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025)
AFQT 1.049 0.446 0.956 0.387
(0.093) (0.122) (0.093) (0.122)
AFQT x Experience ….. 0.060 ….. 0.070
….. (0.012) ….. (0.015)
*Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber/White, accounting for multiple observations per person.  
All regressions also include a quartic time trend, dummy variables for urban residence, as a quartic polynomial in the experience 
measure and interactions of grade with the time trend.  OLS regressions use years of potential experience and IV estimates
use years of actual experience with potential experience as an instrument. Table 3.  Asymmetric Learning.
OLS Wage Regressions Using Potential Experience*.
I II III
Grade 1.0064 0.8341 0.9783
(0.1363) (0.1337) (0.1345)
Grade x Experience -0.0283 -0.0361 -0.0441
(0.0186) (0.0181) (0.0183)
Grade x Spell Length 0.0621 0.0625 0.0497
(0.0138) (0.0135) (0.0146)
White 0.3408 -0.5131 -0.0030
(0.1717) (0.1891) (0.1945)
White x Experience 0.1190 0.1262 0.1004
(0.0207) (0.0204) (0.0231)
White x Spell Length -0.0201 -0.0339 -0.0838
(0.0364) (0.0354) (0.0390)
AFQT ….. 0.9878 0.3967
….. (0.0901) (0.1201)
AFQT x Experience ….. ….. 0.0307
….. ….. (0.0150)
AFQT x Spell Length ….. ….. 0.0540
….. ….. (0.0219)
*Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber/White, accounting for multiple observations per person.  
All regressions also include a quartic time trend, a dummy variable for urban residence, quartic polynomials in the experience measure 
and spell duration and interactions of grade with the time trend.Table 4.  Asymmetric Learning.
IV Wage Regressions Using Actual Experience*.
I II III
Grade 0.9510 0.7640 0.9249
(0.1636) (0.1602) (0.1587)
Grade x Experience -0.0004 -0.0104 -0.0181
(0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0274)
Grade x Spell Length 0.0236 0.0277 0.0084
(0.0252) (0.0250) (0.0265)
White 0.0240 -0.8447 -0.2710
(0.2700) (0.2735) (0.2643)
White x Experience 0.1647 0.1666 0.1456
(0.0365) (0.0361) (0.0387)
White x Spell Length -0.0094 -0.0087 -0.0905
(0.0575) (0.0571) (0.0639)
AFQT ….. 0.9336 0.2758
….. (0.0939) (0.1327)
AFQT x Experience ….. ….. 0.0274
….. ….. (0.0246)
AFQT x Spell Length ….. ….. 0.0837
….. ….. (0.0337)
*Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber/White, accounting for multiple observations per person.  
All regressions also include a quartic time trend, a dummy variable for urban residence, quartic polynomials in the experience measure 
and spell duration and interactions of grade with the time trend.  Potential experience and its interactions are used as instruments for 
actual experience and it's interactions.  The residual of spell duration regressed on the worker's average spell duration, actual 
experience, duration of the current job and a dummy variable for missing values of duration is used as an instrument for spell 
duration; and the residual's interactions are used as instruments for spell duration's interactions.Table 5.  Separating Tenure from Earlier Periods in the Spell.
OLS Estimates of Wage Regressions*.
I II III
Grade 1.023 0.852 0.990
(0.137) (0.135) (0.136)
Grade x Experience -0.027 -0.035 -0.042
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Grade x (Spell-Tenure) 0.061 0.062 0.045
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Grade x Tenure 0.062 0.061 0.050
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
White 0.454 -0.382 0.102
(0.175) (0.191) (0.198)
White x Experience 0.112 0.118 0.094
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
White x (Spell-Tenure) -0.052 -0.070 -0.140
(0.059) (0.057) (0.064)
White x Tenure -0.015 -0.026 -0.068
(0.040) (0.039) (0.043)
AFQT …. 0.982 0.423
…. (0.091) (0.123)
AFQT x Experience ….. …. 0.028
….. …. (0.015)
AFQT x (Spell-Tenure) ….. …. 0.071
….. …. (0.032)
AFQT x Tenure ….. …. 0.047
….. …. (0.026)
*Note:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are Huber/White, accounting for multiple observations per person.  
All regressions include a quartic time trend; a dummy variable for urban residence; quartic polynomials in the experience measure, 
(spell length - tenure) and tenure; interactions of grade with the time trend; and a missing value dummy variable for tenure along with 
the appropriate interactions.